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ABSTRACT
Financial and insurance theories explain that large widely-held corporations manage corporate risks if doing 
so is cost-ective to reduce frictional costs such as taxes, agency costs and financial distress costs. A large number of 
previous empirical studies, most in the U.S., have tested the hypotheses underlying corporate risk management with 
financial derivative instruments. In order to quantify corporate hedge demand, most previous studies have used 
the ratio of principal notional amount of derivatives to company size, although they recognize that company size is 
not an appropriate proxy for financial risk. This paper analyzes the interest-rate-risk hedge demand by Australian 
companies, measured through the ratio of principal notional amount of interest rate derivatives to interest-rate-risk-
bearing liabilities. Modern panel data methods are used, with two panel data sets from 1998 to 2003 (1102 and 465 
observations, respectively). Detailed information about interest-rate-risk exposures was available after manual data 
collection from financial annual reports, which was only possible due to specific reporting requirements in Australian 
accounting standards. Regarding the analysis of the extent of hedge, our measurement of interest-rate-risk exposures 
generates some significant results di erent from those found in previous studies. For example, this study shows that 
total leverage (total debt ratio) is not significantly important to interest-rate-risk hedge demand and that, instead, 
this demand is related to the specific risk exposure in the interest bearing part of the firm’s liabilities. This study finds 
significant relations of interest-rate-risk hedge to company size, floating-interest-rate debt ratio, annual log returns, 
and company industry type (utilities and non-banking financial institutions).
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1 INTRODUCTION
The relative importance of corporate interest-rate-risk 
management has been analysed by previous studies in the 
United States and in Australia. Bodnar et al. (1998 [9]) 
show the results from a survey of financial risk manage-
ment by U.S. non-financial firms. About 50% of the firms 
in the survey state that they use derivatives. Among de-
rivative users, 83% use derivatives to hedge for eign ex-
change risk, 76% use derivatives to hedge interest rate risk 
and 56% use derivatives to hedge commodity price risk. 
Therefore, the survey indicates that corporate foreign-ex-
change-risk hedging in the United States is relatively more 
important. However, a survey by Benson and Oliver (2004 
[4]) shows that interest-rate-risk hedging is relatively more 
important to non-financial compa nies in Australia. In their 
survey, 76% of the respondents use derivatives. Among 
the respondents, 63% use derivatives to hedge interest 
rate risk, 58% use deriva tives to hedge foreign exchange 
risk and 29% use derivatives to hedge commodity price 
risk. In fact, the relative greater importance of interest rate 
risk in Aus tralia must be one of the reasons why Austra-
lian accounting standards require companies to report this 
risk with more detail.
Bartram (2001 [2]) points out the importance of inter-
est rate risk management for non-financial corporations. He 
argues that interest rate risk has direct e ects on financial 
assets and liabilities but that there are also indirect e ects 
on the value of real assets and projects. However, the fact 
that non-financial firms have a larger proportion of non-
financial assets in their balance sheets makes it more 
di cult for them to match financial assets and liabilities, 
in order to achieve complete immunization. Therefore, this 
study recognises the importance of the interest rate risk 
management of non-financial companies through the risk 
con trol of interest-rate-bearing liabilities.
This paper analyzes the corporate demand for interest-
rate-risk management in Australia.We show that previous 
studies have faced data limitations in order to measure 
relevant variables. For example, due to limitations in the 
information available in financial reporting, most previous 
studies were not able to quan tify firms’ financial risk expo-
sures. In consequence, the usual dependent variable used 
to measure the extent of financial hedging is the ratio of 
principal notional amount of derivatives to firm size. Most 
previous studies explicitly recognise the limitations of us-
ing this variable, but no better variable was available under 
the accounting standards in force at the time the data was 
generated. Therefore, this study builds on previous studies 
in the sense that it is able to measure the interest-rate-risk 
exposures of non-financial Australian companies.
Since 1997 Australian accounting standards require 
detailed reporting of compa nies’ interest-rate-risk expo-
sures. According to the reporting rules in force since 1997, 
Australian companies are required to report the value of 
interest-rate-risk exposures and the extent to which these 
exposures are hedged with derivative financial instruments. 
Therefore, a manual collection of this detailed information 
makes it possible to measure the extent of interest-rate-
risk hedging with the ra tio of principal notional amount 
of derivatives to total interest-rate-risk-bearing liabilities. 
As far as we are aware, this is the first empirical study to 
measure the risk exposure of corporate interest-rate-risk-
bearing liabilities. This has impor tant implications to the 
empirical results, as shown in the following sections.
The two data sets used in this study cover respectively 
1102 and 465 observa tions from 1998 to 2003. The first 
data set is used in a probit model to analyse the corporate 
decision to hedge interest rate risk. As in many previous 
studies, the binary dependent variable is equal to 1 if the 
company hedges with interest-rate derivatives and equal to 
0 if otherwise. The empirical results are similar to those in 
previous studies, finding a significant importance of com-
pany size to the decision to hedge with derivatives. The 
second data set is used to analyse the extent of hedging1. 
The analysis is done with different model specifications 
and by comparing the results of using two different depen-
dent variables: 1) the ratio of principal notional amount of 
interest-rate derivatives to company size, which is the de-
pendent variable used in previous studies; and 2) the ratio 
of principal notional amount of interest-rate derivatives to 
total interest-rate-risk-bearing li abilities.
The results show how some estimates are very differ-
ent depending on the de pendent variable used. For exam-
ple, when the dependent variable is the ratio of principal 
notional amount of derivatives to company size the re-
sults show a significance of leverage, which is a common 
result in previous results using this dependent variable 
(for example, see Samant (1996 [46]). However, leverage 
is not significant if the dependent variable is the ratio 
of the principal notional amount of derivatives to inter-
est-rate-risk-bearing liabilities. In this case, it is possible 
to notice the significant importance of the proportion 
of floating-interest-rate risk debt. Finally, the paper con-
cludes that future research will benefit from more detailed 
hedging reporting due to the recent changes implement-
ed by the International Financial Reporting System (IFRS), 
whose hedging reporting re quirements became operative 
in January 2005.
1 We assume that firms hedge interest rate risk when they use derivatives to switchthe interest rate of their future interest payments from floating to fixed.
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2 THEORETICAL MOTIVATIONS FOR CORPORATE
RISK MANAGEMENT WITH DERIVA TIVES
For perfect, frictionless market assumptions hedging 
decisions have been shown to be irrelevant to the share-
holders of the firm that hedges the risk. However the theo-
retical assumptions under which hedging is irrelevant do 
not hold in prac tice and real world hedging decisions add 
value to a firm under more realistic market assumptions. 
By relaxing the theoretical assumptions, hedging becomes 
important in the risk and capital management of the firm.
The classic paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958 [40] 
and 1963 [41]) showed that under conditions of perfect 
capital markets, and some other conditions2, the fi nancial 
decisions of a firm are irrelevant in the sense that they do 
not change the total value of the firm. This follows from the 
fact that shareholders can reverse engineer the financing 
decisions of the firm on their own account at fair market 
prices. Corporate risk management with derivatives is part 
of the financial deci sions of the firm, so it is also irrelevant 
under these conditions.
The problem of asymmetric information is approached 
by Mayers and Majluf (1984 [37]) in a model in which 
managers of the firm know more about the firm’s value 
than potential investors. The model assumes no taxes, 
transaction costs or other capital market imperfections. 
It shows that in some cases management, if it acts on 
the behalf of existent shareholders, will not issue shares 
even if it means giving up a good investment opportu-
nity (a positive-NPV project). That happens because the 
cost to existent shareholders of issuing shares at a cheap 
price may be higher than the return of the investment 
opportunity. Therefore, their model predicts that firms 
would prefer debt to equity if they need exter nal funds 
because debt issue will not make the stock price to fall. 
Thus, a firm with good financial slack (large amount of 
cash or marketable securities, or the ability to issue risk-
free debt) would undertake any positive-NPV projects, 
but companies facing financial distress would eventually 
pass up some profitable in vestment opportunities. May-
ers and Majluf (1984 [37]) suggest that firms can build up 
financial slack by restricting dividends when investment 
expenditures are low.
Stulz (1984 [50]) points out the role of risk aversion of 
managers to explain cor porate hedging. Stulz states that 
managers decide the hedging policy of the firm, but not 
shareholders. It is assumed that managers choose policies 
that maximize their expected lifetime utility given their 
compensation contract and their ex pectation of the ac-
tions shareholders or other potential investors can take to 
decrease their expected utility. Unlike outside stockhold-
ers, managers may not be able to fully diversify since they 
may hold a relatively large portion of their wealth in the 
firm’s stock. Thus, risk averse managers will tend to en-
gage the firm in a more active hedging policy.
Smith and Stulz (1985[49]) show that value-maximiz-
ing firms will hedge for three reasons: (1) taxes, (2) costs 
of financial distress, and (3) managerial risk aver sion. If 
corporate tax expenses are a convex function of taxable 
income, then, by Jensen’s inequality, hedging can reduce 
the variability of taxable income and the expected value 
of taxes. Smith and Stulz state that hedging can mitigate 
costs of financial distress by reducing expected transac-
tion costs of bankruptcy. Also, firms may gain from in-
creasing the price of new debt by including contractual 
provisions (convenants) in bond issues, which guarantee 
potential bondholders that firms will hedge after the sale 
of debt. Finally, hedging can increase firm value by reduc-
ing the compensation required by managers to bear their 
nondi versifiable claims on the firm. However, hedging will 
increase firm value only if it is cost-effective.
Breeden and Viswanathan (1998 [11]) and DeMarzo 
and Duffe (1995 [16]) argue that managers may hedge so 
as to protect their reputation as good professionals, which 
is assessed by the job market based on their firms’ perfor-
mance.
Froot et al. (1993 [23]) also suggest that firms can 
avoid having to pass up profitable investment opportuni-
ties through reducing variability of cash flow with financial 
hedging. Their rationale is that market imperfections make 
ex ternal financing more costly than financing with internal 
funds. Additionally, the marginal cost of external financing 
increases with the amount already raised externally. They 
argue that a shortfall in cash may be costly to the firm 
not only because of expensive outside financing, but also 
because of some decrease in investment. Because of the 
diminishing marginal returns of investment, it is necessary 
to reduce the level of investment in order to compensate 
for the more expensive external financing, whose marginal 
costs increase with the quantity of outside money raised. 
Therefore, hedging can increase the value of the firm by 
reducing variability in cash flows.
Schrand and Unal (1998[48]) approach the multiple 
sources of risk which are bundled together in a single as-
set or liability and which affect the distribution of firms’ 
cash flows. For example, one single asset can be subject to 
many risks such as: input and output price risk; foreign ex-
change rate risk; interest rate risk; credit risk; liquidity risk; 
market risk; regulatory risk; political risk; com petition risk 
etc. However, firms can reallocate these risks using cash 
market or derivative instruments. Risk reallocation is desir-
able because firms have a com petitive advantage in bearing 
risks related to their activities (core-business risk) but have 
2 Other conditions are: individuals have equal access to the capital market; ho mogeneous expectations and information is costless to both investors and firms; andinvestment 
strategies of firms are given.
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no competitive advantage in bearing most financial risks 
(homogeneous risk). Schrand and Unal define coordinated 
risk management as the process of simultaneously increas-
ing core-business risk and decreasing homogeneous risk to 
achieve or maintain a target total risk level. They provide 
empirical evidence of this happening in the savings and 
loan industry by examining firms which con verted from 
mutual to stock ownership structure. Their findings indi-
cate that firms may use hedging not only for risk reduc-
tion, but also for reaching a risk allocation that represents 
the most favourable risk-return trade-off.
3 INTEREST RATE SWAPS
The theories above explain that cash-flow volatility is 
costly for the firm because of capital market imperfections. 
However, in the specific case of hedging interest risk with 
swaps, hedging can also be explained because it can lower 
the cost of debt financing.
Visvanathan (1998 [53]) discusses many theories that 
explain the use of interest rate swaps. The assumption is 
that companies prefer long-term fixed-rate debt, but in-
terest rates for this type of debt are very high. Therefore, 
companies borrow short-term (floating-rate) debt and 
then use interest rate swaps to create “synthetic” long-
term fixed-rate debt.
According to Flannery (1986 [19]), Diamond (1991 [17]), 
and Titman (1992 [51]) borrowing firms with private informa-
tion on their future performance may prefer short-term debt 
when they expect to obtain favourable results in the short 
term. In fact, if results turn out to be favourable then they will 
be able to benefit from lower interest loans. The asymmet-
ric information problem comes from the fact that prospective 
creditors may believe that companies seeking fixed-rate long-
term debt may be not expecting favourable results so that the 
interest rate should account for a higher risk of default.
Another explanation is that creditors are subject to 
agency costs of debt, such as the “underinvestment” and 
the “risk-shifting‘” problems. Wall (1989 [54]) points out 
that creditors would require a higher rate to compensate 
the higher risk of fixed-rate long-term debt.
Therefore, in both cases above firms have an incentive 
to issue short-term debt and then use interest rate swaps 
to obtain a “synthetic” long-term fixed-rate debt which 
has a lower interest rate than the original long-term fixed-
rate debt.
Important factors in interest rate hedging are: 1) the 
benefits of hedging for reducing the costs related to cash-
flow volatility (expected tax costs; costs of financial distress; 
agency and asymmetric information costs); 2) the benefits 
of interest rate hedging in reducing the cost of interest ex-
penses; 3) the extent of ex-ante interest rate exposure, i.e., 
the relative contribution of interest rate risk to total cash-
flow volatility. Empirical evidence of these theories is given 
by Saunders (1999 [47]), for interest rate swaps. DaDalt, 
Gay and Nam (2002 [15]) provide empirical evidence that 
currency derivatives, besides interest rate derivatives, can 
also mitigate asymmetric information problems. They pro-
vide evidence that both the accuracy and consensus in mar-
ket analyst’s earnings fore casts are higher for firms that use 
derivatives than for those that do not.
4 TESTABLE HYPOTHESES
Two different dependent variables are used to measure 
interest rate risk hedging activity. The first dependent vari-
able is the principal notional value of interest rate deriva-
tives scaled by company size, which, as stated before, has 
been used by most previous studies on hedging demand. 
The choice of this dependent vari able by previous research-
ers was mainly due to the limited information required in 
financial reporting by accounting standards at the time pre-
vious studies were written. The second dependent variable 
used aims to overcome this limitation and is based on the 
ratio of principal notional amounts of interest rate deriva-
tives to total interest-rate-risk-bearing liabilities, as men-
tioned above. In fact, the measurement of interest rate risk 
exposures being hedged was only possible due to reporting 
requirements existing in Australia since 1997. However, this 
information is not available in electronic data bases and had 
to be collected manually from financial reports.
Table 1  gives details of the sample size, the company 
type investigated, the data source, the year the data sets 
refer to, the country from which companies are studied and 
the scope of financial instruments investigated. It can be 
seen that only 7 out of these 30 empirical studies were done 
with data sets from countries other than the United States. 
Regarding the demand for hedging with deriva tives, four 
previous studies include data from Australian companies 
(One of the four studies, Bartram et al. ([3] 2004), covers 
48 countries including Australia). However, all of these four 
studies were unable to measure the risk exposures be ing 
hedged, so that the dependent variable used is the principal 
notional amount of derivatives scales by company size.
The hypotheses tested empirically in this paper can be 
classified into the fol lowing groups: 1) Taxes; 2) Cost of 
Financial Distress3; 3) Underinvestment Problem; 4) Eco-
nomies of Scale; 5) Shareholders’ value creation.
3 Includes substitutes for hedging, which can also be used to mitigate costs of financial distress
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 Table 1  Previous Empirical Studies Hedging Demand
Author(s Year Sample size Company type Source Country Year Data Scope
Nance et al. 1993 434 Nonfinancial Survey USA 1986 Derivatives
Berkman and 
Bradbury 
1996 244 Nonfinancial Annual Reports New 
Zealand
1994 Derivatives
Fenn, Post and 
Sharpe
1996 384  Nonfinancial Compact 
Disclosure and 
Compustat
USA 1994 IR derivatives 
Mian 1996 169 Nonfinancial Annual Reports USA 1992 FX and IR 
derivatives 
Samant 1996 354 No banks or 
utilities 
Compact 
Disclosure and 
Compustat 
USA 1990-91 IR swaps 
Tufano 1996 48 Gold Mining Survey USA 1991-93 Commodity 
price der.
Colquitt and 
Hoyt 
1997 571  Life Insurers Annual reports USA 1991 or 
1992  
Derivatives
Fok, Carroll and 
Chiou 
1997 331  Nonfinancial  Annual Reports USA 1990-92 Derivatives 
Geczy et al. 1997 372 Nonfinancial Annual Reports USA 1991 FX derivatives 
Gay and Nam 1998 486 Nonfinancial Swaps Monitor 
Database 
USA 1995 All and IR 
derivatives 
Howton and 
Perfect 
1998 451 Nonfinancial Annual Reports USA 1994 All, FX and IR 
derivatives 
Visvanathan 1998 410 Nonfinancial S&P 500 reports USA 1992, 
1993 
IR derivatives 
Saunders  1999 297-438-497 Nonfinancial Annual reports 
- Compustat 
USA 1991, 
1993,
and 1995
IR derivatives 
Haushalter 2000 100 Oil & Gas Annual Reports/
Survey 
USA 1992-95 Commodity 
price der.
Allayannis and 
Ofek 
2001 724 Nonfinancial Annual Reports USA 1992-93 FX deriva-
tives
Cummins 2001 1216 and 
1668 
Insurers Annual reports 
NAIC
USA 1994 Derivatives 
Hentschen and 
Kothary 
2001 297-260-283 Nonfinancial Annual Reports/
Compustat
USA 1991, 
1992, 
1993
Derivatives 
Berkman et al. 2002 158 Industrial and 
mining 
Survey Australia 1995 FX, IR, 
comm. price 
der.
Graham and 
Rogers 
2002 442 Nonfinancial SEC’s EDGAR/
Compustat
USA 1994 or 
1995 
FX and IR 
derivatives 
Nguyen and Faff 2002 239-230 nonbanking Connect4 Australia 1999-
2000 
Derivatives 
Guay and 
Kothary 
2003 234 Nonfinancial Compustat USA 1997 FX, IR, 
comm. price 
der.
Nguyen and Faff 2003 239-230 nonbanking Connect4 Australia 1999-2000 Derivatives 
Bartram et al. 2004 178 in
Australia 
(7309) 
Nonfinancial Thompson 
Analytics DB 
and Global R.
48
countries 
2000 or 
2001 
Derivatives 
Purnanandam 2004 3000 Nonfi nancial Compustat USA 1996-
1997
FX and IR 
derivates
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4.1 Taxes:
The convexity of the effective tax function can create 
incentives for firms to hedge. However, the progressivity of 
corporate tax rates are not the only rea son for the convex-
ity of the effective tax function. Tax preference items such 
as tax loss carry-forwards, investment tax credits and for-
eign tax credits can also affect the convexity of the effective 
tax function [Graham and Smith (1999 [27])].
Therefore, there are two factors that can affect this con-
vexity:
(1) The progressivity in the corporate tax rate.
(2) Tax credits (or “tax preference items”) such as tax 
loss carry-forwards and carry-backs, investment 
tax credits and foreign tax credits. Because these 
tax credits can only be used if companies have a 
suffciently large pre-tax income, companies have 
an incentive to hedge and increase the likelihood 
of being able to use their tax credits as soon as 
possible.
Therefore, tax issues provide the following hypothesis4  
in relation to corporate hedging:
4 All hypotheses here assume “ceteris paribus”.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The higher the convexity of the corporate ef fective tax function the 
higher the corporate demand for hedging.
The following proxy variables will be used to test this 
hypothesis in this paper:
Proxy for H1:
• Future tax benefits scaled by the book value of assets.
Companies with large amounts of future tax benefits have a motiva tion to increase the likelihood 
that future pre-tax income is positive, so that they can make use of their tax credits.
The following studies use proxies to measure the ef-
fect of tax credits carried forward. Geczy et al. (1997 [25]), 
Graham and Rogers (2002 [26]), and Pur nanandam (2004 
[45]) use a similar proxy, the net operating losses (NOL) 
scaled by the book value of assets. Nance at al. (1993 
[42]), Tufano (1996 [52]), and Visvanathan (1998 [53]) 
scale net operating losses by firm’s market value. Two 
studies (Fok, Carroll and Chiou (1997 [21]) and Gay and 
Nam (1998 [24])) do not scale the value of net operating 
losses. Four other studies (Mian (1996 [39]), Berkman and 
Bradbury (1996 [6]), Howton and Perfect (1998 [31]), Al-
layanis and Ofek (2001 [1]), and Berkman et al. (2002 [5])) 
use a dummy value that assumes value equal to 1 when 
the firm has net operating losses to be carried forward and 
value zero otherwise.
Nance et al. (1993 [42]) argue that the benefit of hedg-
ing on expected taxes is due to the convexity of the effec-
tive tax function, so that the appropriate factor for scaling 
tax preference items is the firm’s expected taxable income. 
However, proxies for expected taxable income, such as 
EBITDA, may assume negative value, thus generating bias. 
The argument here for using the book value of as sets as 
a scaling factor is the assumption that expected taxable 
income and book value of assets should be proportional 
across firms. Any cross-section variation in this proportion 
should be small relative to the cross-section variation in 
future tax benefits.
Graham and Smith (1999 [27]) argue that the existence 
of NOL carry-forwards does increase the tax incentive to 
hedge for firms with expected profits. However, they also 
argue that NOL carry-forwards provide a disincentive to 
hedge in the case of company with expected losses, which 
could make the impact of NOL carry-forwards on the deci-
sion to hedge ambiguous. Graham and Rogers (2002 [26]) 
also point out that existent tax credits, such as NOL carry-
forwards, can be a proxy for financial distress, rather than 
a tax motivation to hedge.
4.2 Expected Costs of
  Financial Distress Hypothesis
If hedging can reduce variability of future financial re-
sults then it can also reduce the expected costs of financial 
distress. As explained before, these costs can be classified 
as both direct and indirect bankruptcy costs.
Therefore, expected costs of financial distress provide 
the following hypothesis in relation to corporate hedging:
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It is important to recognise two components of a com-
pany’s expected costs of financial distress: 1) the extent of 
the exposure to financial risk; 2) the proba bility of adverse 
financial outcomes. Therefore, proxy variables used to test 
this hypothesis should be able to take these two compo-
nents into account.
For example, if a company has a high financial leverage 
then the extent of its expected costs of financial distress will 
depend not only on the size of debt but also on the vari-
ability of total debt. Although leverage is a relevant proxy 
for expected financial distress costs, ideally one should also 
be able to measure other factors that could influence these 
costs. In fact, some of these factors can be diffcult to mea-
sure, for example: company’s risk appetite, operational risk, 
regulatory risk, competition risk, regulatory risk, and politi-
cal risk. Also, at the empirical research level, it is diffcult to 
quantify important factors such as corre lations between as-
sets and liabilities. These correlations are important to pro-
vide a measure of total financial risk.
Therefore, despite the fact that financial leverage is 
generally accepted as a proxy for total financial risk, one 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The higher the expected costs of financial dis tress the higher the 
corporate demand for hedg ing.
should, where possible, quantify the original sources of 
financial risk and how they relate to each other. An ex-
ample is the case in which a company has a “not so 
high” debt-to-equity ratio but there is much mismatch 
between assets and liabilities. In this case there is also 
a high expected cost of financial distress due to the high 
probability that the payment of liabilities will not be 
honoured.
The level of debt risk also has to be considered. For ins-
tance, a company could have a “not so high” debt-to-eq-
uity ratio but most of its debt could be very uncertain, e.g., 
all of the debt could be indexed to a floating interest rate. 
Here the probability of financial distress is high despite the 
fact that leverage is not so high.
Finally, one should ensure that leverage is measured be-
fore the company hedges, so that it reflects the company’s 
ex ante financial risk. For example, in the case of insurers, 
leverage is affected after reinsurance is contracted, since 
there is a reduction in the outstanding claims reserve.
The following proxy variable will be used to test hypo-
thesis 2 (H2) in paper:
Proxies for H2:
• The ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Leverage).
• The ratio of current assets to current liabilities (Current Ratio).
• Free cash flow (scaled by asset value).
• The ratio of financial assets to financial liabilities (Financial Ratio).
• The ratio of floating interest rate debt to total interest bearing liabilities (Float Ratio).
• Earnings per share (EPS).
All previous studies use some measure of financial lever-
age as a proxy for a firm’s financial distress. This study mea-
sures leverage by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, 
as also used by Graham and Rogers (2002 [26]), Nguyen and 
Faff (2002 [43]), Bartram et al. (2004 [3]), and Purnanandam 
(2004 [45]). Other studies use proxies such as the ratio of 
capital to debt or the ratio of debt to equity.
The current ratio is used as a measure of financial li-
quidity and is equal to the ratio of current assets to cur-
rent liabilities. It measures the firm’s ability to hon our its 
liabilities in the short run. This same liquidity measure was 
use by Nance et al. (1993 [42]), Mian (1996 [39]), Fok et 
al. (1997 [21]), and Nguyen and Faff (2002 [43]).
Free cash-flow is used as a proxy for financial distress/streng-
th and equals the operational cash flow minus capital expendi-
ture and dividends. It is a measure of a firm’s liquidity after the 
firm has paid for everything, including investments. For exam-
ple, Saunders (1999 [47]) also free cash flow to measure liqui-
dity and test the asset substitution hypothesis. Some previous 
studies classify liquidity as a “hedging substitute”, instead of 
associating it directly to financial distress. This is in line with 
the argument by Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993[23]) that 
external financing is costlier than internal financing. Therefore, 
it can be argued that less liquid firms have a smaller financial 
buffer and should then be more likely to hedge with derivatives. 
However, it is only true if we observe ex-ante liquidity. It is ex-
pected that after firms hedge they may obtain a higher level of 
(ex-post) liquidity. Because the data used in this paper contains 
only ex-post liquidity, the hypothesis here is that higher liquidi-
ty is related to more interest-rate-risk hedge5.
5 It is important to consider that derivatives are off-balance-sheet financial instru ments, so they do not directly affect balance-sheet accounts. For example, interest-rate-risk 
hedging can change the firm’s debt composition (the floating-to-fix mix) without changing the value of total debt. Therefore, with the exception of “free cash flow”, the other 
proxy variables for hypothesis 2 can be considered as ex-ante proxy variables.
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Financial reports from Australian companies provide 
enough detail about finan cial assets and liabilities6. This 
study also uses the ratio of financial assets to financial 
liabilities (Financial Ratio) to measure the firm’s financial 
strength. This proxy was not found in previous studies. 
Because interest rate is a financial risk, it makes sense to 
use a measure of financial strength based on financial as-
sets and liabilities.
Because this study aims to analyse the corporate de-
mand for interest rate hedg ing, it is important to use an 
explanatory variable which proxies for interest rate risk 
exposure. We use the ratio of floating interest rate to to-
tal interest-rate-risk bearing liabilities. Graham and Rogers 
(2002 [26]) also use a similar explanatory variable, the 
sum of debt in current liabilities plus long-term floating 
debt, scaled by total debt.
Earnings per share (EPS) equal the net profit after tax, 
less outside equity in terests and preference dividends di-
vided by diluted weighted number of shares outstand-
ing during the year. Again, some previous studies classify 
dividend pay out as a “hedging substitute” item. How-
ever, the hypothesis here is that a higher dividend payout 
decreases the chance that funds will be available to pay 
fixed liabilities. Dividend policy can also be a proxy for 
growth opportunities, but this problem is overcome with 
the use of a specific proxy (research and development ex-
penditure – R&D).
4.3 Underinvestment Cost Hypothesis
Financially distressed firms may reject positive NPV 
projects because the bene fits would accrue mainly to bond-
holders at the shareholders’ expense. Therefore, hedging 
can mitigate the agency cost of underinvestment through 
reduction of the probability of future financial distress.
Theory indicates that the underinvestment problem is 
greatest for leveraged firms which have significant growth 
options in their investment set. This implies the following 
hypothesis:
6 Financial assets include for example cash, receivables, and investment accounted for using the equity method. Financial liabilities include payables and bank overdrafts and 
loans. Financial assets and liabilities are also classified in three categories related to interest rate: floating interest, fixed interest rate, and non-interest bearing.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The higher the growth opportunities of the leveraged firm the 
higher the corporate demand for hedging.
The following proxy for growth opportunities is used:
Proxies for H3:
• Research and development expenditure (R&D) scaled by total assets.
Many previous empirical studies also use R&D ex-
penses to test the underinvest ment motivation to hedge 
(NANCE et al., (1993 [42]), FOK et al., (1997 [21]), GEC-
ZY et al., (1997 [25]), GAY; NAM, (1998 [24]), HOW-
TON; PERFECT, (1998 [31]), ALLAYANNIS; OFEK, (2001 
[1]), GRAHAM; ROGERS, (2002 [26]); PURNANAN-
DAM, (2004 [45])). Another common proxy variable 
used in previous studies is the market-to-book ratio. 
However, while most previous studies found statisti cally 
significant results for R&D, most results using the mar-
ket-to-book ratio were insignificant or the sign of the 
estimated coeffi cient was different than ex pected. One 
possible reason for this is the diffculty in measuring the 
firm’s book value, used in the market-to-book ratio cal-
culation. For example, it is diffcult to value a firm’s intan-
gible assets. Similarly, existing fixed assets are also dif-
fcult to value unless a market for used equipment exists. 
For these reasons, the proxy for growth opportunities in 
this study is only based on R&D.
4.4 Scale Economies Hypothesis
Firm size is a proxy for many factors that impact the 
corporate demand for hedg ing. Yet, there is much contro-
versy about the relation between these factors and firm 
size. For example, it is argued that even small bankruptcy 
costs can be suffcient to induce large firms to hedge, if the 
reduction in expected bankruptcy costs exceeds the costs 
of hedging. However, Warner (1977 [55]) finds that bank-
ruptcy costs are less than proportional to firm size, so that 
the reductions in expected bankruptcy costs are greater for 
small firms, which, for this reason, should be more likely to 
hedge. In the case of reinsurance, Mayers and Smith (1990 
[38]) argue that bankruptcy costs should have a higher im-
pact on smaller firms, and that small firms are less likely 
to have the “specialized internal talent“ available in larger 
firms, so that they would tend to reinsure more. Nance et 
al. (1993 [42]) argue that smaller US firms are more likely 
to have taxable income in the progressive region of the tax 
schedule, again implying that they are more likely to hedge. 
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Cummins et al. (2001 [14]) also argue that larger insurers 
may be more diversified and therefore would demand less 
additional risk management instru ments.
However, on the other side, Block and Gallagher (1986 
[7]) and Booth, Smith and Stulz (1984 [10]) argue that 
hedging programs exhibit informational scale economies 
and that larger firms are more likely to hedge. Also, in the 
case of derivative markets, there are significant scale econ-
omies in the structure of trans action costs, implying that 
large firms are more likely to hedge with these in struments. 
Thus, despite the fact that most empirical results show a 
significant relation between hedging and company size, it 
is argued that the relation be tween hedging and firm size 
is theoretically undetermined.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): company size has an effect on hedging demand, although the sign 
of the effect is ambiguous a priori.
Proxies for H4:
• natural logarithm of company’s total book asset value
Almost all previous empirical studies also use some 
proxy for company size. Like many previous studies (Al-
layannis and Ofek (2001 [1]), Graham and Rogers (2002 
[26]), Guay and Kothary (2003 [28]), Nguyen and Faff 
(2003 [44]), and Bartram et al.(2004 [3])), this study uses 
the natural logarithm of total assets. Instead, Fok et al. 
(1997 [21]) and Saunders (1999 [47]) use the total value of 
assets to proxy company size. Most other empirical stud-
ies measure company size by using the market value of 
equity plus the book value of debt.
4.5 Corporate Hedging and
  Shareholder’s Value Creation
Risk management at the firm level is only economically 
feasible if the increase in firm value is greater then the hed-
ging costs, and if shareholders cannot benefit from a simi-
lar increase in value by managing risk on their own account 
at a lower cost. Therefore, if firms hedge, it is expected that 
hedging is being used to increase firm value through reduc-
tion in taxes, costs of financial distress and agency costs. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is assumed:
Hypothesis 5.1 (H5.1):  hedging increases the value of the firm through reduction in 
taxes, expected costs of financial distress and agency costs.
There are many variables that could be used to measure 
the increase in firm value, such as return on investment 
(ROI), return on assets (ROA), economic and market value 
added (EVA and MVA), Tobin’s Q, price-earnings ratio, and 
stock price return. This study uses the annual log return in 
stock prices to proxy the increase in firm value. The ratio-
nale is that more interest-rate-risk hedging is associated 
with higher annual increase in share price.
Proxy for H5.1:
• annual log return in share price.
Finally, Table 2  summarizes the hypotheses to be tes-
ted and the expected esti mation results in this paper.
 Table 2  Hypotheses Tested on Corporate Hedging
Explanatory Variable Hypothesis Expected Sign
Future Tax Benefit H1 (+)
Leverage H2 (+)
Financial Ratio H2 (–)
Float Ratio H2 (+)
Current Ratio H2 (–)
Free Cash Flow H2 (–)
Earnings per Share (EPS) H2 (+)
D&E H3 (+)
Ln Assets H4 (+/–)
Ln Returns H5 (+)
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5 PREVIOUS STUDIES AND DATA AVAILABILITY
When mentioning the previous empirical studies on 
interest-rate-risk hedging, it is important to take into ac-
count the accounting standards in force at the time the 
studies were written. In fact, despite the substantial im-
provements in hedg ing reporting, the accounting stan-
dards in the U.S. in the 1990s imposed some limitations to 
empirical work. An important limitation was the unavail-
ability of quantified financial risk exposures. With this, the 
principal notional amount of derivatives (scaled by com-
pany size) was the most used proxy for hedging activity 
in previous studies. Fortunately, since 1997 the Australian 
accounting standards require detailed information on in-
terest risk exposures of Australian corporations and on the 
hedging instruments used to manage these exposures. Be-
cause of this, this study is able to show the improvements 
in empirical analysis that are possible when one is able to 
quantify the exposures being hedged.
Since January 2005, many countries, including Australia, 
have adopted the accounting standards issued by the Inter-
national Accounting Standard Board (IASB). Therefore, these 
countries will benefit from a standardized Interna tional Fi-
nancial Report System (IFRS). With regards to the financial 
reporting of derivative financial instruments, the IFRS fol-
lows the developments of stan dards previously required by 
accounting boards in many countries, such as the Finan-
cial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) in the US and the 
Australian Ac counting Standard Board (AASB) in Australia. 
Although the US did not fully adopt the IFRS in 2005, the 
FASB and the IASB have been working in the convergence of 
their accounting standards since 2002, so that the remain-
ing dif ferences are expected to be overcome soon.
Most previous studies on the corporate demand for 
hedging with derivatives are based on reported data from 
US companies in the 1990s, when disclosure of derivative 
financial instruments became compulsory. However, the 
extent of informational disclosure on derivatives differed 
substantially in the US and in Australia until the conver-
gence of accounting standards in January 2005.
In particular, since 1997 Australian companies have 
started to report more de tailed information about the hed-
ging of interest rate risk with derivatives. An important 
difference from the US reporting requirements was that 
Australian companies had to report interest rate risk expo-
sures, measured by interest-rate risk-bearing item, besides 
the notional amount of derivatives used. Since 1990 the 
FASB had required US companies to report the notional 
amounts of derivatives used, but not the value of hedged 
items. Graham and Rogers (2002[26]) state that Current 
financial reporting guidelines do not require firms 
to disclose the underlying asset and/or liability that 
is being hedged with a derivative contract. Thus, 
most previous studies based on US companies could not 
measure ex-ante risk exposures directly, so that the “hedge 
ratio” could also not be precisely calculated. In fact, the 
FASB only made the reporting of financial risk exposures 
compulsory since December 2000, with FASB Statement 
No. 133.
This fact explains why most previous empirical studies 
on the corporate demand for hedging with derivatives by 
US companies were based primarily on the no tional amount 
of derivatives scaled by company size. In fact, this was the 
best proxy available for hedging activity at the time they 
were written. Exceptions to this are previous studies based 
on the commodity price hedging in the gold industry (Tufa-
no (1996 [52])) and in the oil and gas industry (Haushalter 
(2000 [29]) and Lookman (2004 [36])), in which proxies 
for the hedge ratio are built based on the level of expected 
future production. However, for these proxies to be appro-
priate, the level of production must be close to the level of 
sales (the sales revenue is the hedged item). Furthermore, 
these previous studies on commodity price risk provide 
results that cannot be generalized to all companies since 
they refer to risks specific to the gold mining and the oil 
and gas industries. More general results are obtained with 
studies on foreign exchange risk or interest risk, since they 
are common in all types of companies.
Table 3  shows previous studies on hedging with de-
rivatives since 1993. The ta ble shows the authors’ names; 
the year of publication; the data source, the time range 
and the country from which data was collected; and the 
dependent vari able used in the studies. It can be seen that, 
with the exception of Haushalter (2000 [29]) and Lookman 
(2004[36]), all other previous studies used the ratio of no-
tional value of derivatives to asset value as a proxy to the 
hedge ratio.
6 ACCOUNTING STANDARDS IN THE US
Table 4  lists the FASB Accounting Standards that 
affected the reporting of cor porate risk management with 
derivatives until the adoption of the IFRS in 2005.
The FASB Statement No. 105 was a product of the first 
phase on disclosure of information about financial instru-
ments in the US. With this statement, in 1990 US com-
panies were required to report notional principal amounts 
of financial instruments with off-balance-sheet risk (i.e., 
the risk of accounting loss for finan cial instruments that 
exceeds the amounts reported on the balance sheet) and 
concentrations of credit risk (e.g., the maximum amount of 
exposure on such fi nancial instruments should any party 
to the agreement fail to perform his or her duties). This 
standard applied primarily to swap contracts and required 
disclo sure of the face or contract amount and the nature 
and terms of the instrument.
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 Table 3  Previous Studies on Corporate Hedging: Data and Proxies Used
Author(s) Date Source of Data Country Dependent Variable 
Nance et al. [42] 1993 Survey (1996) USA Binary: hedgers / non hedgers 
Mian [39] 1996 Annual Reports (1992) USA Binary: hedgers / non hedgers 
Berkman and Bradbury [6] 1996 Annual Reports (1994) 
New 
Zealand 
Notional value of derivatives / assets 
Tufano [52] 
1996 
Survey (1991-93) USA Notional value of derivatives / gold price 
exposure 
Samant [46] 
1996 Annual Reports (1990-92) 
USA Binary: hedgers / non hedgers and notio-
nal value / assets 
Fenn, Post and Sharpe [20] 1996 Annual Reports (1995) USA Notional value of derivatives / assets 
Colquitt and Hoyt [12] 1997 Annual Reports NAIC (1992) 
USA Binary: hedgers / non hedgers Notional 
value / assets 
Fok, Carroll and Chiou [21] 1997 Annual Reports (1990-92) USA Binary: hedgers / non hedgers 
Geczy et al. [25] 1997 Annual Reports (1991) USA Binary: hedgers / non hedgers 
Gay and Nam [24] 1998 Proxy statement (1995) USA Notional value of derivatives / Assets 
Howton and Perfect [31] 1998 Annual Reports (1994) 
USA Notional value of Derivatives / market 
value of equity 
Visvanathan [53] 1998 Annual Reports (1992-93) USA Binary: IR derivatives users and non-users. 
Saunders [47] 
1999 
Annual Reports (1991,1993,and 
1995) 
USA Binary: hedgers / non hedgers 
Haushalter [29] 
2000 
Annual Reports (1992-1994) 
Survey (1995) 
USA Percentage of oil and gas production 
hedged 
Allayannis and Ofek [1] 2001 Annual Reports (1992-93) 
USA Binary: hedgers / non hedgers; notional 
value / assets 
Cummins et al. [14] 2001 Annual Reports (1994) USA Volume of derivative transactions / assets 
Hentschel and Kothari [30] 2001 Annual Reports (1991-1993) USA Standard deviation of daily equity returns 
Berkman et al. [5] 2002 Survey (1995) Australia Binary: hedgers / non hedgers 
Graham and Rogers [26] 2002 Annual Reports (1994-95) USA Net notional value of derivatives /assets 
Nguyen and Faff [43] 2002 Annual Report (1999 and 2000) 
Australia Binary: hedgers / non hedgers; notional 
value / Assets 
Guay and Kothary [28] 2003 Annual Reports (1997) USA Notional Value of derivatives / assets 
Nguyen and Faff [44] 2003 Annual Report (1999 and 2000) Australia Notional Value of Derivatives/Assets 
Bartram et al. [3] 2004 Annual Reports (2000 or 2001) 
48
countries 
Binary: hedgers / non hedgers 
Purnanandam [45] 2004 Annual Reports (1996-1997) USA Notional value of derivatives / assets 
 Table 4  FASB Statements and Hedging Reporting
FASB
Statement 
No.
Statement Title Issued Date Operative Date 
FAS 105 
Disclosure of Information about Financial Instru ments with Off-Balance-Sheet 
Risk and Financial Instruments with Concentrations of Credit Risk
1990 Mar 1990 Jun 
FAS 107 Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instru ments 1991 Dec 1992 Dec 
FAS 119 
Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instru ments and Fair Value of Financial 
Instruments 
1994 Oct 1994 Dec 
FAS 133 Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedg ing Activities 1998 Jun 
1999 Jun (deferred 
to 2000 Jun) 
FAS 138 
Accounting for Certain Derivative Instruments and Certain Hedging Activi-
ties-an amendment of FASB Statement No. 133 
2000 Jun 2000 Jun 
FAS 149 
Amendment of Statement 133 on Derivative In struments and Hedging 
Activities 
2003 Apr 2003 Jun 
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Since December 1992, the FASB Statement No. 107 re-
quired entities to disclose the fair value of financial instru-
ments, both assets and liabilities recognized and not rec-
ognized in the statement of financial position. Therefore, 
with this state ment the fair value of derivative financial 
instruments had to be reported.
However, the data sets available in the U.S. in the early 
1990s imposed some lim itations on empirical analysis. 
Hentschel and Kothari (2001 [30] p.117) analyse the use of 
derivatives with a sample of US corporation from 1991 to 
1993. In their conclusions they comment that Our data 
show the considerable limitations of the deriva-
tives disclosures under the current US accounting 
standards. Firms do not have to disclose the sign or 
the magnitude of their derivative exposures, only 
the notional principal of their positions. (...) The 
crudeness of the information makes it diffcult to 
determine whether an individual firm is reducing or 
taking risks with derivatives.
Since December 1994, the FASB Statement No. 119 re-
quired disclosure of amounts, nature, and terms of derivative 
financial instruments that were not subject to FASB State-
ment No. 105 because they did not result in off-balance-
sheet risk of accounting loss. It was applicable to derivative 
financial instruments such as futures, forwards, swaps, op-
tion contracts and other financial instruments with similar 
characteristics. Also, for the first time this standard required 
a distinction to be made between financial instruments held 
or issued for trading purposes and financial instruments 
held or issued for purposes other then trading.
We can notice from Table 3 that the first empirical 
studies tested the decision to hedge or not to hedge with 
derivatives (FRANCIS; STEPHAN, (1993 [22]); NANCE; 
SMITH; SMITHSON, (1993 [42]); DOLDE, (1995 [18]); 
WYSOCKI, (1996 [56]); MIAN, (1996 [39]); COLQUITT; 
HOYT, (1997 [12]); FOK; CARROLL; CHIOU, (1997 [21]); 
GCZY; MINTON; SCHRAND, (1997 [25]). These studies 
classified companies between hedgers and non-hedgers, 
built a binary dependent variable, and then used a probit/
logit econometric model to test the decision to hedge.
Since December 2000, FASB Statement No. 133 re-
quired more detailed infor mation on the fair value of assets 
and liabilities involved in the corporate risk management 
activities. This time, disclosures applied in determining 
the fair value of a financial instrument, with detailed in-
formation required not only for derivative instruments, 
but also for the hedged items. Therefore, this statement 
required the identification of the hedging instrument, the 
hedged item, the nature of the risk being hedged, and 
how the hedging instrument’s effectiveness in offsetting 
the exposure to changes in the hedged item’s fair value 
attributable to the hedged risk was assessed. Despite the 
data availability on hedged items since FASB Statement 
No. 133, Table 3 shows that the most recent studies in 
the US did not make use of this type of information. Last-
ly, the FASB Statements No. 138 and 194 amended and 
clarified the reporting structure defined in the Statement 
No. 133.
 Table 5  AASB Statements and Hedging Reporting
Statement No. Statement Title Issued Date Operative Date
AASB 1034 (1996) Information to Be Disclosed in Financial Re ports 1996 Dec 1997 30 June 
AASB 1033 and AAS 33 (1996) Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments 1996 Dec 1997 31 Dec 
AASB 1034 (1999) Financial Report Presentation and Disclosures 1999 Oct 2001 30 June 
AASB 1033 and AAS 33 (1999) Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instru ments 1999 Oct 2001 Jan 
7 ACCOUNTING STANDARDS IN AUSTRALIA
Regarding the Australian reporting standards, the first 
requirements of finan cial reporting of derivatives instru-
ments appeared in the Australian Accounting Standard 33 
(AAS 33, and AASB 1033) in December 1996. The AASB 
1034, also issued at that time, defined the more general 
requirements for the financial reports. Both AAS 33 and 
AASB 1034 were amended by their then new versions in 
1999 (See Table 5 ).
Although AAS 33 did not require very detailed infor-
mation on derivative in struments in general (if we compa-
re with the equivalent requirements made at that time by 
the FASB in the US), this accounting statement did require 
enough detailed information about interest rate risk expo-
sures and their management with derivatives.
Since December 1997, Australian companies had to 
show in their annual reports their interest rate risk ex-
posures and hedges by class of asset and liability. These 
classes are: 1) floating interest rate risk bearing; 2) fixed 
interest rate risk bear ing; and non-interest rate risk bearing 
(e.g., payments to trade creditors).
Therefore, with quantified interest rate risk exposures, 
by class of liability, and the corresponding notional princi-
pal amounts of derivatives used, it is possible to measure 
ex-ante interest rate risk exposure and the extent of ex-
post hedging positions of Australian companies.
An important thing is that it was possible to first iden-
tify whether companies were actually subject to interest 
rate risk because they had to report interest rate risk expo-
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sures even if they did not hedge these risks. Therefore, the 
classi fication of companies between hedgers and no-hedg-
ers is more accurate.
Additionally, Statement AAS 33 required entities 
to state the objectives for holding or issuing derivative 
financial instruments, the context needed to un derstand 
those objectives, and their strategies for achieving those 
objectives. Therefore, this requirement made it possible 
to verify whether companies were using derivatives and 
if their reasons for using derivatives were for hedging 
or trading purposes. A significant number of companies 
report their interest rate risk exposures together with 
the principal notional value of derivatives used to hedge 
them, which makes it possible to measure the size of 
hedges.
8 THE IFRS AND THE REPORTING OF HEDGING
Since 1 January 2005, the Australian equivalent of IFRS 
has been fully imple mented through accounting standards 
AASB 101-141. It is a requirement that all reporting enti-
ties in Australia adopt the standards as they have replaced 
the previous Australian standards.
Differently from the AASB, the FASB has not adopted 
the IFRS at full in 2005. Instead, since 2002 the FASB and 
the IASB have been implementing two joint convergence 
projects. While significant progress towards international 
conver gence is expected to be made in the next few years, 
the volume and complexity of issues implied that many di-
fferences between IFRS and the US GAAP remained beyond 
January 2005. However, the remaining differences in the 
reporting of derivatives and hedging are not substantial 
enough to cause any significant dis advantages between 
future studies that may be based on either IFRS or on the 
US GAAP.
For example, the IFRS provides enough detail on how 
to recognise (identify) and measure (quantify) financial as-
sets and liabilities; derivatives (including embed ded deriva-
tives); hedging instruments (derivative or non-derivative); 
and hedged items. Additionally, companies need to report 
hedging effectiveness, i.e., the de gree to which changes 
in fair value or cash flows attributable to a hedged risk 
are offset by changes in the fair value or cash flows of the 
hedging instrument.
Also important for future research on corporate risk 
management, the IFRS requires more detailed information 
about executives’ remuneration. Statement AASB 1046, 
operative since June 2004, requires companies to properly 
identify and quantify the following components of execu-
tives’ remuneration: 1) primary benefits (cash salary, bo-
nuses and profit-sharing); 2) post-employment benefits; 
3) equity compensation (shares and options); 4) any other 
remuneration.
As far as interest rate risk hedging is concerned, state-
ments IAS 39 / AASB 139 require risk identification and 
measurement in the following steps below:
• the portfolio of items to be hedged should be 
identified;
• analysis of the portfolio of items;
• decision about how much to hedge;
• decision about which interest rate to hedge;
• designation of hedging instruments;
• effectiveness analysis of the hedging;
• periodical measurement of the change in the fair 
value of the hedged items;
• periodical measurement of the change in the fair 
value of the hedging instru ments;
• identification of any hedging ineffectiveness.
It can be noticed that, in relation to the previous ac-
counting standards, the IFRS provides substantial improve-
ment on hedging reporting. An important point is that re-
searchers will be able to have a clear idea of measurable 
risks faced by companies and how much of these risks are 
being hedged with financial or non financial instruments.
Therefore, future research will benefit from the avail-
ability of “hedge ratio” of each hedged risk exposure in a 
given company. As shown before, the appropriate mea-
surement of the “hedge ratio” is important for the robust-
ness of empirical analysis of the demand for hedging, in 
the sense of correctly identifying which factors drive the 
corporate use of hedging instruments to manage different 
risk exposures.
 Table 6  International Financial Reporting Standards
Statement No. Statement Title Issued Date Operative Date 
AASB 1046 Director and Executive Disclosures by Disclos ing Entities 2004 Jan 2004 30 Jun 
AASB 1046A Amendments to Accounting Standard AASB 1046 2004 Sept [ending] 2004 1 Jul 
AASB 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures 2005 Aug 2007 1 Jan 
IAS 1 / AASB 101 Presentation of Financial Statements 2003 Dec / 2004 July 2005 1 Jan 
IAS 32 / AASB 132 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation 2003 Dec / 2004 July 2005 1 Jan 
IAS 39 / AASB 139 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 2003 Dec / 2004 July 2005 1 Jan 
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9 THE AUSTRALIAN DATA SET ON INTEREST RATE RISK HEDGING
In order to analyse the corporate demand for interest 
rate risk hedging in Australia, two panel data sets are built 
based on financial information from S&P/ASX 300 compa-
nies7, from 1998 to 2003.
The first panel data set contains financial information 
from 189 companies, which are classified into hedgers and 
non-hedgers. This data set is used to analyse the corpo-
rate decision to hedge interest rate risk. The second data 
set contains only interest rate risk hedging companies. 
This data set contains observations from 78 companies, 
with detailed information about the interest rate risk ex-
posures being hedged. In fact, this study focuses on cor-
porate interest rate risk hedging because interest rate risk 
exposures are the only financial risk exposures that can be 
properly measured given the information available in the 
annual reports of Australian companies. Although other 
risks such as foreign currency risk and commodity price 
risk are reported, they are not reported in enough detail 
to be associated with the financial derivative instruments 
used to hedge them. On the other hand, Australian com-
panies do report detailed information about their interest 
risk exposures and about the interest rate derivatives used. 
Moreover, a previous survey by Benson and Oliver (2004 
[4]) shows that interest-rate-risk management is relatively 
more important for Australian companies than the man-
agement of foreign currency and commodity price risks. A 
possible reason for this is that Australian companies tend 
to borrow money locally, so that most of the loans are in 
local currency.
Balance sheet data and stock price data were obtained 
from the ASPECT Finan cial data set and from the ASX Daily 
data set, provided by SIRCA8. Interest rate risk exposures 
and hedging information are manually collected from an-
nual reports provided by Connect49.
Some exclusions were necessary from the original data 
set. Judge (2003 [33]), p.19) explains that most previous 
studies on hedging with derivatives restrict their analysis to 
the hedging activities of non-financial companies because 
finan cial firms are both users and providers of risk manage-
ment products. However, in this study only financial insti-
tutions which provide interest rate risk instruments, such 
as banks, are excluded from the sample, so that financial 
institutions that do not provide them, such as insurers, 
are not excluded. Other companies were also excluded be-
cause there was not enough financial information about 
them, or because financial information was available only 
for a very limited number of years.
In order to create the first data set, which distinguishes 
companies that hedge interest rate risk from those which 
do not, all available annual reports from ASX 300 compa-
nies were examined. After the exclusions mentioned above, 
the final data set comprises 189 companies. Companies 
are then classified as “hedgers” if they report the use of 
interest rate derivative instruments and as “non-hedgers” 
if otherwise, or if they report that they do not use inter-
est rate derivatives. Therefore, out of 189 companies, 108 
companies are classified as hedgers and 81 companies are 
classified as non-hedgers. Finally, a binary variable is cre-
ated (“1” for hedgers and “0” for non-hedgers) so that it 
can be used in a probit regression to analyse the decision 
to hedge interest rate risk.
Table 7  shows the summary statistics for the data 
set used to analyse the corpo rate decision to use interest 
rate derivatives. The variables in Table 7 are proxies that 
potentially explain this decision.
The second data set is used to analyse the extent of 
interest rate hedging. It comprises of 78 hedging compa-
nies compared to the 108 hedging companies in the first 
data set. The reason for this is that 30 hedging companies 
do not provide enough financial information so that inter-
est rate exposures can be measured properly. Companies 
in this data set are able to report the value of their inter-
7 The S&P / ASX 300 index represented 91% of the Australian market at June 30, 2002.
8 Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) www.sirca.org.au
9 www.connect4.com.au. The University of New South Wales (UNSW) provides ac cess to data sets from both SIRCA and Connect4 to UNSW students and researchers.
10 “LN ASSETS” is the logarithm of assets value, which proxies for company size; “LEVERAGE” is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; “LN RETURNS” is the annual log 
return in share prices; “FUTURE TAX BENEFIT” is the ratio of future tax benefits to total assets; “R&D” is the ratio of research and development expenditure to total assets; the 
“CUR. RATIO” is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities; “FREE CASH FLOW” is the ratio of free cash flow to total assets; and “EPS” are earnings per share.
 Table 7  Summary Statistics – Hedgers and Non-Hedgers
Variable10 N Mean Median Max. Min. Skew. 
Ln Assets 1102 19.471 19.884  25.900   10.030 –3.595 
Leverage 1102  0.476  0.500   4.669    0.000  4.719 
Ln Returns 1102  0.029  0.000   4.994   –2.940  1.013 
Future Tax Benefi t 1102  0.015  0.007   0.173    0.000  2.644 
R&D 1102  0.124  0.003  23.578    0.000 20.170 
Cur. Ratio 1102  3.014  1.420 133.489    0.014  9.630 
Free Cash Flow 1102 –0.043 –0.012   3.037   –1.558  2.307 
EPS 1102 16.021 12.600 219.000 –402.000 –1.956 
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est bearing liabilities and the principal notional amounts 
of interest rate derivatives used to hedge interest rate risk 
associated to these liabilities. In addition, all these compa-
nies report a statement similar to the following:
The consolidated entity is exposed to changes 
in interest rates. The consol idated entity uses inte-
rest rate derivative financial instruments to hedge 
its interest rate exposure. Derivative financial ins-
truments are not held for spec ulative purposes.
This means that these companies have identified their 
interest risk exposures and reported the use of interest rate 
derivatives for hedging purposes only.
Table 8  shows summary statistics for explanatory 
variables in the data set of interest rate hedging compa-
nies. This table contains two additional explanatory vari-
ables: the financial ratio, and the float ratio. In fact, 
 Table 8  Summary Statistics – Interest Rate Hedging Companies
Variable N Mean Median Max. Min. Skew. 
Ln Assets 465 20.33 20.58 23.55   14.39 –5.71 
Leverage 458  0.51  0.51  0.99    0.07  0.03 
Financial Ratio 424  4.22  2.20 70.84    0.11  5.75 
Float Ratio 422  0.74  0.88  1.00    0.00 –0.95 
Ln Returns 465  0.04  0.03  4.99   –2.94  2.08 
Future Tax Benefi t 458  0.02  0.01  0.08    0.00  1.28 
R&D 465  0.09  0.00 12.41    0.00 11.96 
Cur. Ratio 458  1.43  1.30  8.70    0.01  2.26 
Free Cash Flow 458 –0.01 –0.01  3.04   –0.96 11.12 
EPS 465 20.28 16.70 162.80 –174.00 –0.63 
information about these two variables was only available 
in annual reports of companies which report their interest 
rate risk hedging activities in detail. Australian companies 
have to report financial assets and liabilities in detail. In 
addition, companies have to report three types of debt: 
1) floating-interest-rate debt; 2) fixed-interest-rate debt; 
and non-interest-rate-bearing debt. The financial ratio is 
the ratio of financial liabili ties to financial assets. The float 
ratio is the ratio of floating-interest-rate debt to total in-
terest rate bearing liabilities. This variable measures the 
floating-to-fixed mix of interest bearing liabilities before 
any effects from interest rate derivatives. Therefore, this 
variable is a proxy for ex-ante interest-rate-risk exposure.
The available data set makes it possible to observe 
the floating-to-fixed mix of interest-rate-risk-bearing li-
abilities both before and after hedging with interest rate 
derivatives. Figure 1  shows the float ratio before hedg-
ing (ex-ante floating-to-fix mix) from 1998 to 2003. It can 
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 Figure 2  Floating-to-Fixed Mix After Hedging
be noticed that in all years this ratio is spread between 
0 and 1, despite some concentration between 0.4 and 1. 
How ever, Figure 2  shows an important effect of inter-
est-rate-risk hedging on this floating-to-fixed mix. Figure 2 
shows that after hedging the floating-to-fixed mix is very 
concentrated between 0 and 0.5. Moreover, it also shows 
that this mix does not vary much within companies from 
year to year. An important conclu sion is that companies 
use interest-rate derivatives to continuously adjust their 
target floating-to-fixed mixes. Empirical results in this pa-
per show that the ex-ante floating-to-fixed mix is one of 
the very significant variables explaining the corporate de-
mand for interest-rate-risk hedging.
Table 8 also shows that interest rate hedging companies 
have on average a float ratio of 0.74, which means that on av-
erage 74% of their interest bearing liabilities are indexed to a 
floating interest rate. A median float ratio of 0.88 means that 
50% of the companies have a float ratio of at least 88%.
The mean leverage and the median leverage are both 
approximately 0.51, so that companies’s total liabilities 
are on average 51% of their assets. The financial ratio 
(financial assets to financial liabilities) is on average 4.22, 
but the median much lower, 2.20. Additionally, the cur-
rent ratio (current assets to current liabilities) is on average 
only11 1.40, and its median is 1.30. Free cash flow is on 
average approximately zero.
Table 8 shows that future tax benefits are on average 
equivalent to 2% of the company’s asset value. This is the 
tax benefit from tax losses, which can be car ried forward 
indefinitely by Australian companies. However, companies 
need to have positive results to make use of tax benefits. 
Therefore, it is expected that firms with large amounts of 
future tax benefits would hedge more to insure they have 
better chances of obtaining positive results.
11 The current ratio is an indication of the company’s ability to meet short-term debt obligations. If the current ratio is more than 2, then the company is generally consid ered 
to have good short-term financial strength.
10 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
10.1 Probit Regression – The Decision
to Use Interest Rate Derivatives
Table 9 shows the results for the probit regression mo-
del used to analyse the cor porate decision to hedge inte-
rest rate risk. In this regression analysis, however, a single 
year regression is used instead of a panel regression, using 
six-year data. The reason for this that a panel probit re-
gression assumes that the decision to hedge in each year is 
independent from the decision to hedge in previous year.
Since this assumption is not realistic in this case, a 
single year probit regression is more appropriate. Therefore, 
Table 9  shows the results obtained by using data from 
1998 (regressions with data from other years also provide 
similar results).
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The dependent variable assumes value “1” if the com-
pany hedges interest rate risk with derivatives and “0” 
otherwise. The results show that company size is the only 
significant significant factor explaining the decision to 
hedge with in terest rate derivatives.
This result reinforces the relevance of economies of 
scale in the decision to hedge with interest rate deriva-
tives in Australia. The following section shows the anal-
ysis of the decision of how much hedge with interest rate 
derivatives.
10.2 Empirical Results on the Extent of 
Interest Rate Risk Hedging
Table 10  shows the estimation results for the extent 
to which companies hedge their interest rate risk expo-
sures with derivatives. The data set used contains annual 
observations from 78 companies, from 1998 to 2003. Ta-
ble 10 also shows 6 different model specifications (model 
1 to model 6), obtained from different com binations of ex-
planatory variables. The values in parentheses under the 
estimates are the p-values for those estimates. The correla-
tion matrix for the explanatory variables in this data set is 
given by Table.1. The values in this correlation ma trix show 
us that multicollinearity is not a problem in this data set. 
Section B.3 of Appendix B provides plots of correlations 
between these explanatory variables.
All 6 models were estimated the two different depen-
dent variables, as explained above: 1) “N. VALUE/AS-
SETS”12, the notional value of derivatives divided by asset 
value, which is the dependent variable largely used in pre-
vious empirical studies; and 2) “HEDGE RATIO” which the 
ratio of the notional value of deriva tives to interest bearing 
liabilities13. The latter is intended to provide a better proxy 
for interest rate risk hedging activity, since its denominator 
gives a more appropriate measure of the company’s inte-
rest rate risk exposure than company size. In fact, previous 
 Table 9  Probit Regression Results – The Decision to Hedge Interest Rate Risk
Regressor Probit Estimate (p-value) 
Constant –7.4540 (0.000) 
Ln Assets  0.4011 (0.000) 
Leverage –0.0381 (0.853) 
Ln Returns  0.3066 (0.343) 
Future Tax Benefi t –5.0242 (0.324) 
R&D –0.0537 (0.216) 
Cur. Ratio –0.0112 (0.233) 
Free Cash Flow  0.7425 (0.233) 
EPS  0.0037 (0.425) 
studies have only used company size as a proxy for risk 
exposure because of the lack of a more appropriate proxy. 
Diagnostic tests show that this panel data set has panel 
heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correla tion and serial 
correlation. Hence, OLS with PCSEs are used to estimate 
the parameters. As in Chapter 4, unit-specific dummies are 
included to account for fixed-effects14.
Table 10 includes three additional industry dummy va-
riables, which are sig nificant in all model specifications15: 
1) “D_util”, for the utility industry; 2) “D_fin”, for the 
financial industry16; and 3) “D_propt”, for the property 
trust industry.
The results in Table 10 show that estimates can be qui-
te different depending on the dependent variable used. For 
example, in Model 1 the estimates for the LEVERAGE and 
for FUTURE TAX BENEFIT are significant if we use the N. 
VALUE/ASSETS as the dependent variable, but not if the 
dependent variable is the HEDGE RATIO. The estimates for 
the FLOAT RATIO in Model 1 are significant regardless the 
choice of dependent variable. However, the value of the-
se estimates are quite different: 0.1434 when the depen-
dent variable is the N. VALUE/ASSETS, and 0.6019 when 
the dependent variable is the HEDGE RATIO. Model 1 also 
shows that the estimates for the CONSTANT and for the 
FINANCIAL RATIO are very insignificant in both cases. For 
this reason, these explanatory variable are not included in 
models 2 to 6.
It is important to note that the positive and significant 
estimate for LEVERAGE obtained using the dependent va-
riable N. VALUE/ASSETS in Model 1 is a common result in 
previous studies. However, using the HEDGE RATIO the 
esti mate for LEVERAGE is not significant. This comparison 
suggests that previous results would probably have obtai-
ned different estimated results if better proxies for the risk 
exposures had been available. In fact, if the “true” interest-
rate-risk exposure is an important factor behind interest-
12 N. VALUE/ASSETS is the abbreviation for the ratio of notional value of derivatives to assets. This is the dependent variable used in most previous studies to measure the 
extent of hedging with derivatives.
13 The R2 was approximately 0.91 for all the regressions using the N. VALUE/ASSETS and 0.89 for all the regression using the HEDGE RATIO. The R2 are relatively high due to 
the inclusion of many unit-specific dummies to the model.
14 Interestingly, fixed-effects regressions (not shown) provided very similar results, ex cept for the fact that they are not able to provide estimates for time-invariant dum-
mies.
15 Dummy variables for the following industries were tested in Model 1, one at a time, and were all insignificant: Consumer Discretionary; Consumer Staples; Energy; Health-
Care; Industrials; Information Technology; Materials; Telecommunications Services.
16 This excludes entities which provide financial derivative instruments, such as banks.
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rate-risk hedging, then mismea surements of this factor may 
significantly affect the analysis of interest-rate-risk hedging 
demand. A detailed comparison of results from Model 2 is 
given below.
Model 2 includes only explanatory variables that are 
significant. We can see that when the dependent varia-
ble is the N. VALUE/ASSETS the most expressive explana-
tory variables are: the FUTURE TAX BENEFIT (0.8438) and 
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LEVERAGE (0.4451). Also, in this case the estimate for the 
FLOAT RATIO is 0.1464, which is even smaller than the es-
timates for the dummy variables D_util (0.2426), and D_
propt (0.1901). Finally, the remaining significant estimates 
are small in value: –0.0133 for the CONSTANT, 0.0199 for 
the LN RETURNS, and 0.0225 for D_fi n.
On the other hand, when the HEDGE RATIO is used as 
the dependent variable in Model 2 some estimates are very 
different. In this case, the most expressive estimate is that of 
the FLOAT RATIO (0.6136). This is a more reasonable result 
if we consider the previous analysis of this data set, in which 
the ex ante floating to-fixed ratio and the ex post floating-
to-fixed ratio are very different. Therefore, a consistent re-
sult should be the one in which the estimated coeffi cient 
for the FLOAT RATIO is quite expressive. The estimates for 
LEVERAGE and FUTURE TAX BENEFIT are highly insignificant 
and, therefore, are not included. The estimate for LN SIZE is 
almost zero (–0.005), implying that company size has al-
most no impact on the extent of hedging. The estimated 
coeffi cient of 0.0400 for the LN RETURNS means that more 
hedging is associated with higher returns in annual share 
prices. Finally, in this model specification the most impor-
tant industry dummy variable is D_util (0.1609), while D_
fin and D_propt have less expressive estimates (0.0888 and 
0.0956, respectively).
Models 3 to 6 include, one at a time, dummy variables 
for research and devel opment expenses R&D, for the cur-
rent ratio CUR. RATIO, for free cash flow FREE CASH FLOW 
and for earnings per share EPS. At this point, the analysis 
should concentrate only on the estimated results provided 
my model specifica tions which use the HEDGE RATIO as 
the dependent variable, since it is believed to better captu-
re the risk exposures being hedged with interest rate deri-
vatives. Model 3 shows that the estimate for R&D is very 
insignificant. Models 4 to 6 show significant estimated co-
effi cients for the other dummy variables: 0.0294 for CUR. 
RATIO, 0.1650 for FREE CASH FLOW, and 0.0005 for EPS. 
This results indicate that companies which hedge more are 
able to have a considerable higher level of free cash flow 
than companies that hedge less. The estimates for the cur-
rent ratio and for EPS, although significant, are very small, 
implying that there is not much difference between the 
levels of current ratio and EPS of firms that hedge more as 
compared to to those levels in companies that hedge less.
In sum, the estimated results using the HEDGE RATIO 
in Models 217 mean the following:
• size has a very small negative impact on the extent 
of hedging;
• leverage the Financial Ratio and Future Tax Benefi t 
have no signifi cant impact on the extent of hedging 
(Model 1) and therefore are not include in this mo-
del specification;
• both the Float Ratio and D util the are the most 
relevant explanatory vari ables. This means that 
companies with higher proportion of floating inte-
rest risk debt or utility companies hedge more with 
interest derivative instruments;
• the significant and positive estimated coeffi cient for 
Ln Returns shows that higher annual share prices 
returns are positively associated with more interest 
rate hedging;
• the results from other industry dummy variable 
estimates show that compa nies from financial and 
property trust industries also hedge more than com-
panies from other industries (except the utilities 
industry).
Models 3 to 6 also test the relevance of the following 
variables, one at a time: R&D (research and development 
expenditures), CURRENT RATIO, FREE CASH FLOW and 
EPS. The results show that the estimated coeffi cient for 
R&D is in significant. The estimated results for the other 
dummies are significant, but only the estimated coeffi cient 
for free cash flow is expressive.
17 Model 2 was estimated with year dummy variables (from 1999 to 2003), which had all insignificant estimates. All other models were estimated with and without year dum-
mies, but they generated very similar results. Year dummies had insignificant estimates in all cases. Models 1 and 3-7 show estimated results obtained without year dummies.
11 CONCLUSION
This study provides new relevant results for corporate 
interest-rate-risk man agement with derivatives. It shows 
that the measurement of financial risk ex posures being hed-
ged is crucial to the robustness of the empirical analysis of 
hedging demand. The paper shows how previous studies 
were limited in their ability to measure risk exposures due 
to limitations on financial reporting. However, reporting 
accounting standards specific to Australian corporations 
make it possible to properly identify and quantify interest-
rate-risk exposures so that adequate proxy variables can be 
used in this study. In fact, as far as we are aware, this is the 
first empirical study to measure the floating-to-fixed mix 
of interest-rate-risk-bearing liabilities. This measurement 
makes it possible to build an explanatory variable based 
on the ratio of the notional value of derivatives to interest-
rate-risk-bearing liabilities. Previous studies, on the other 
hand have used a dependent variable based on the ratio 
of the notional amount of deriva tives to asset value, al-
though most of them recognize that asset value is not an 
appropriate proxy for the hedged risk exposures.
The results show how some estimates are very differ-
ent depending on the depen dent variable used. If the de-
pendent variable is the ratio of principal notional amount 
of derivatives to company size then the results show a 
significance of leverage, which is a common result in pre-
vious studies which use this dependent variable. How-
RCF-46-USP_A7-Corporate.indd   104 1/4/2008   09:28:17
CORPORATE INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT WITH DERIVATIVES IN AUSTRALIA: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 105
R. Cont. Fin. • USP • São Paulo • v. 19 • n. 46 • p. 86 - 107 • janeiro/abril 2008
ever, leverage is not significant if the dependent variable 
is the ra tio of the principal notional amount of derivatives 
to interest-rate-risk-bearing liabilities. This result makes 
sense because leverage (e.g., total liabilities to total as-
sets) does not give precise information about the firm’s 
interest-rate-risk ex posure. This exposure depends on the 
floating-to-fixed mix in interest-rate-risk bering part of li-
abilities and not on the total value of liabilities. The em-
pirical results show the significant importance of the pro-
portion of floating-interest-rate risk debt. The rationale is 
that firms have stable risk tolerances which determine 
their target floating-to-fixed mix of interest-rate-risk-
bearing liabilities. There fore, how much firms will hedge 
depends on how much the current floating-to-fix mix de-
fers from the target one. This study also finds significant 
relations of interest-rate-risk hedging with company size, 
floating-interest-rate debt ratio, annual log returns, fu-
ture tax benefits, and company industry type (utilities 
and non-banking financial institutions).
Finally, future research will benefit from more detailed 
hedging reporting due to the recent changes implemented 
by the International Financial Reporting Sys tem (IFRS), 
whose hedging reporting requirements became operative 
in January 2005. Under the IFRS, financial reports will pro-
vide a detailed measurement of corporate risk exposures 
and financial and non-financial instruments used to hedge 
them. This will enable future research to obtain a more ro-
bust empirical analysis of the driving factors behind corpo-
rate risk management.
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